I study a one-way flow connections model in which players are heterogeneous with respect to values and the costs of establishing a link. I show that values and costs heterogeneity are equally important in determining the level of connectedness and the architecture of equilibrium networks. I also show that when asymmetries are independent of the potential partner there are distributions of costs and values for which centrality is a distincitive feature of equilibrium networks. This sharply contrasts with the homogeneous case.
Introduction
The role of social and economic networks in shaping individual behavior and aggregate phenomena has been widely documented in recent years. 1 This has lead scholars in different disciplines to investigate the structural properties that networks exhibit in reality. The most stable empirical finding is that networks have very asymmetric architectures. Specifically, they exhibit high level of centrality: there are few nodes having many links, while the majority of nodes maintain few links. The connections model is the primary model used to explain the strategic I thank an anonymous referee for useful comments. The paper has benefited from discussion with Gabriella Conti, Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, Fernando Vega-Redondo and Sanjeev Goyal.
A. Galeotti Social and Information Science Laboratory, CALTECH, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA Department of Economics, University of Essex, Colchester, UK E-mail: agaleotti@ist.caltech.edu formation of networks. 2 Variants of this model have been proposed in order to analyze different social and economic situations. Nevertheless, much of the work has explored the formation of undirected networks: a link induces benefits to both parties, i.e., two-way flow networks. In reality many networks are directed: the flow of benefits is directed only towards the investor of the link, i.e., one-way flow networks. For example, the World Wide Web is a directed network: nodes are agents maintaining a webpage and links are hyperlinks that point from one web page to the other. 3 Bala and Goyal (2000) analyze a non-cooperative model of network formation where players are homogeneous and there is one-way information flow. They show that if a player's payoffs are increasing in the number of other players accessed and decreasing in the number of links formed, a strict Nash network is either a wheel (a connected network in which each player creates and receives one link) or the empty network (with no links). The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider a minimally connected network where player 1 initiates a link with players 2 and 3, and each of these players has a link with player 1. Under the assumption of homogeneous costs of linking and values this network is not a strict equilibrium: player 2 is indifferent between maintaining the link with 1 and switching to player 3, instead. A generalization of this argument implies that a connected strict equilibrium is symmetric and has a wheel architecture. It is worth emphasizing two aspects of this result. The first aspect is that while centrality appears to be a crucial property of directed networks, equilibrium networks are symmetric when players are homogeneous. 4 Secondly, the findings of Bala and Goyal (2000) depend on the assumption of homogenous players. To observe this, assume that player 1 is just slightly cheaper to be linked with than players 2 and 3, ceteris paribus. This small introduction of heterogeneity implies that the network described in the example above becomes a strict equilibrium.
In the current paper, I study the role played by heterogeneous players in shaping the equilibrium architecture of directed networks. Players are heterogeneous in terms of the costs of linking and the values of accessing other players. Ex-ante asymmetries across players arise quite naturally in reality. For instance, in the context of information networks it is often the case that some individuals are more interested in particular issues and therefore better informed, which makes them 2 This model has been extensively studied in the literature; see e.g., Aumann and Myerson (1989) , Bala and Goyal (2000) , Dutta and Jackson (2000), Goyal (1993) , Haller and Sarangi (2005) , Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) , Johnson and Gilles (2000) , McBride (2004) , Slikker and van den Nouweland (2001), and Watts (2001a,b) . The terminology "connections model" has been introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . 3 In general the one-way information flow technology is compelling for the study of communication networks where nodes are "traffic" providers and a link initiated by i towards j signifies that j allows the transit of the traffic to i. A specific example is the internet interconnection networks, where nodes are internet providers. Citations networks are another example, where nodes are published papers and links are reference to previously published papers. A final example are E-mail networks. Here, nodes are address books of individuals and a link from A to B signifies that B's E-mail address appears in A's address book. 4 Albert and Barabási (2002) report that centrality is widely observed on the web: few nodes have a very high number of outgoing and incoming links. They also report similar findings for the internet interconnection networks. Newman, Forrest and Balthrop (2002) find similar properties for E-mail networks. Redner (1998) reports high centrality for citation networks of papers cataloged by the Institute of Scientific Information.
